

Air America: Flying for U.S. and Profit in Asia

By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star-News

BANGKOK — "The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

Thus an unnamed American pilot describes "civilian flying" in Southeast Asia for Air America and the lesser known Continental Air Services — both private companies on contract to the U.S. government. The pilot's comments are part of a confidential, 16-page brochure available at certain Air Force personnel offices. It is shown to Air Force pilots interested in flying for one of the companies upon completing their military service.

The brochure lists no author or publisher, but it offers an illuminating view into the internal operations of Air America, which has played a crucial role in the Indochina war theater since the 1950s. Air America, along with the other companies, has airlifted troops, refugees, CIA agents, American politicians, war material, food and occasionally prisoners all over Southeast Asia.

Extravagant Salaries

The brochure, dated June 29, 1972, boasts that Air America ranked as one of the most profitable corporation in the United States in 1969, a year when most of the world's airlines lost heavily. Air America's customer is the U.S. government.

It employs about 436 pilots, according to the pamphlet, of which 304 are working in Southeast Asia. The center of Air America's operation is Laos, where the presence of military or military-related personnel is prohibited by the much-abused Geneva Conference of 1962.

Air America's profits are high despite the somewhat extravagant salaries it pays for flying personnel. According to the report, a pilot with 11 years experience flying a UH-34D helicopter based at Udorn air base in Thailand an

average of 100 hours monthly, will take home \$51,525. All salaries are tax free.

A newly hired pilot flying a C-7 Caribou transport based in Vientiane, averaging 100 hours flying time monthly, would earn a minimum \$29,442. The U.S. commercial pilot average is \$24,000.

Also available to Air America personnel, in addition to a liberal expense account, is life and medical insurance, two-weeks leave, tickets on other airlines at 20 percent normal cost, PX and government mailing privileges and educational allowances for dependents. Many Air America pilots are retired military men receiving military pensions.

'Good' Investment

Americans can also become "air freight specialists", commonly called kickers. Their job is to push cargo out over drop zones. Salary is \$1,600-\$1,800 per month. Qualifications: American citizenship, air borne training, experience with the U.S. Air Force preferred.

Air America, Inc., is owned by a private aviation investment concern called the Pacific Corp. Dunn and Bradstreet's investment directory places its assets in the \$10-\$50 million category, and rates it "good" as an investment risk. Air America itself employs altogether about 8,000 persons, ranking in size just below National Airlines and above most of the smaller U.S. domestic airlines.

Formerly called Civil Air Transport (CAT), Air America was organized after World War II by General Claire Chennault, commander of the American fighter squadrons in Burma and China known as the Flying Tigers. CAT played a major role in post-war China supplying Nationalist troops. CAT also supplied the French during their phase of the war in Indochina.

Air America is commonly considered an arm of the CIA. In Laos, the CIA for the past 10 years or more has maintained an army of hill tribesmen, mainly Thai and Lao mercenaries. Most of the air supply and transport needs for this army have been handled by Air America.

Military Assistance
Though the brochure does not mention opium explicitly,

it hints at the subject of contraband:

"Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo much more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

Air America works hand-in-hand with the U.S. Air Force. At Udorn air base in Thailand, Air Force mechanics repair the airline's transports and helicopters, many of them unmarked. The Air Force has reportedly leased giant C130 transports when the planes were needed for opera-

tions in Laos. In the section on Air America's benefits, the brochure lists in addition to normal home and sick leave: "Military leave will be granted appropriately" — an apparent acknowledgement that there are military people working directly with Air America.

One should not conclude, however, that the salaries, excitement and tax advantages mean that Air America pilots hope the war will continue. As the brochure's author notes in a typed postscript:

"Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result when implemented, due to inevitable rehabilitation and reconstruction aid in wartorn areas. . . . Job market highly competitive and you'll need all the help you can get."

According to Pacific News Service, the following men sit on the Air America board of directors:

Samuel Randolph Walker — chairman of the board of Wm. C. Walker's Son, New York; director of Equitable Life Assurance Society; member of Federal City Council, Washington, D.C.; member of Action Council for Better Cities, Urban America, Inc., and life trustee, Columbia University.

William A. Reed — chairman of the board of Simpson Timber Co.; chairman of the Co.; director of Crown Simpson Timber Co.; director of

Seattle First National Bank; director of General Insurance Co.; director of Boeing Co.; director of Pacific Car Foundry Co.; director of Northern Pacific Railroad; director of Stanford Research Institute.

Arthur Berry Richardson — foreign service officer in Russia, China and England from 1914 to 1936; chairman of the board of Cheeseborough Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961; director of United Hospital Fund, New York; trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital.

James Barr Ames — law partner in Ropes & Gray, Boston; director of Air Asia Co., Ltd., director of International Student Association; member, Cambridge Civic Association and trustee of Mt. Auburn Hospital.

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On Duty, "Dirty Tricks" and Democracy

A profile of Maj. Gen. ^{Edward} Edwin Lansdale, the original "Ugly American"

By Stanley Karnow

As he walks his poodle along the shaded street near his split-level Alexandria home, Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale resembles any number of retired officers pasturing in the Washington suburbs. He is still lean and erect despite his 64 years, and, like so many military pensioners, he finds life somewhat tame after his adventurous career.

But in contrast to the superannuated colonels who reconstruct battles at the dinner table, Lansdale's experiences were of a high order. For he was in times past a dynamic, influential and often controversial figure who single-handedly managed foreign governments and whose behind-the-scenes counsel helped to shape U.S. policy and practice at critical junctures in recent history.

In the Philippines during the early 1950s, for example, Lansdale virtually directed the campaign against the Communist-led Huk in his capacity as special adviser to Ramon Magsaysay, then that country's defense secretary. In Saigon not long after, he effectively kept South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in office by conspiring to crush his domestic foes while persuading Washington to support him. Later, as the Vietnam war escalated, Lansdale was instrumental in convincing President Eisenhower and Kennedy that the United States and its Vietnamese clients could defeat the Vietcong by relying on counterinsurgency techniques. Some of these techniques, as disclosed in the secret Pentagon Papers, have revealed him to be considerably less savory than the public image of him as an idealist.

Little of the exotic drama that characterized Lansdale's career is apparent in his present manner. He

is a gray, unassuming man whose subdued style borders on self-effacement. Some of his friends suggest that he has lost much of his verve since his wife's death last spring, and he himself concedes that her passing has left him lonely and dispirited. Except for occasional evenings with old cronies, many of them Asia veterans like himself, he leads a rather secluded existence.

Other friends point out that he is weary after years of battling bureaucrats who oppose his unconventional ideas, and Lansdale himself substantiates that view with bitter humor when he says that "the knives going in don't seem to hurt anymore." Yet, as he speaks, it is clear that he still burns with a hard flame that is nearly religious in fervor. His religion, he explains, is not formal. It is his faith that the United States could have successfully played world policeman by propagating its political philosophy.

At the core of Lansdale's doctrine is the conviction that Communist guerrillas can be defeated in brushfire wars by "winning the hearts and minds" of people. In Vietnam, according to this thesis, the United States should have exported American democratic principles along with guns, money, machinery and food. "We couldn't afford to be just against the Communists," Lansdale has written. "We had to be for something."

Lansdale's proposals often provoked the fury of Establishment strategists, some powerful enough to block his advancement. He has also been derided as a dreamer whose perception of reality was, at best, blurred. At the same time, though, he inspired a coterie of disciples who regarded him as nearly infallible. Several years ago in two celebrated novels that, whatever the

validity of their arguments, at least endowed him with a measure of literary immortality. William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick portrayed him in *The Ugly American* as Col. Edwin Barnum Hillendale, whose sweet harmonica purportedly stimulated rural Filipinos to oppose Communism. Graham Greene, on the other hand, depicted him in *The Quiet American* as Alden Pyle, the naive

U.S. official who believed that he could mobilize Vietnamese peasants to resist the Communists by instilling them with the precepts of Town Hall democracy.

Although the old soldier has faded away, the debate lingers on. Just as Lederer and Burdick approvingly quote their hero as saying that "if you use the right key, you can maneuver any person or nation any way you want," so Lansdale's disciples still contend that the United States could have attained its objectives in Vietnam by developing psychological warfare methods more efficacious than those employed by the Communists. This view, which became popular during the Kennedy Administration, is best articulated in the articles of Lansdale's close friend, Robert Shaplen, the *New Yorker* correspondent in Saigon, who has long asserted that the United States and its South Vietnamese proteges could have beat the Communists by preempting the revolution. And just as Graham Greene indirectly reproved Lansdale by declaring that Vietnamese "don't want our white skins around telling them what they want," so his present-day critics claim that he never ac-

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September 1972

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side.

They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists.

The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civilian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on."

The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer.

Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam—

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot

muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta be an easier way to make a buck." The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane.

They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines. Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

continued

Seoul's Hired Guns

by James Otis

THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work with them in Vietnam speak respectfully of the "ROK Marines." Technically, ROK indicates their place of origin—the Republic of Korea (South Korea). But the Americans utter the term as if it were "Rock," and as though it referred to their physical conditioning and the state of their sensibilities: as soldiers they are brutal, licentious and they get results. Militarily, they are trusted by the American high command, which—in the current fighting—has assigned them the responsibility of keeping the vital An Khe Pass open and preventing South Vietnam from being split in half.

Some 37,000 of these troops are presently engaged in South Vietnam. Referred to pretentiously as "allies," their involvement is said to arise from ideological commitment to the cause of freedom, national self-interest, or some other self-serving platitude. In fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired guns of the Orient, who have sold their services to Washington for the duration.

To be specific, the normal salary of a ROK army private is \$1.60 a month. But if that private elects to serve in Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that amount, or \$37.50 a month. In one day, he earns almost as much as he would have made in a whole month had he remained in his homeland—courtesy, to be sure, of the American taxpayer. The middleman of this operation is the government of South Korea, which receives a kickback of well over \$300 million per year for the service.

Such "allies" are to mercenaries what a "protective reaction raid" is to an unprovoked strike and what an "incursion" is to an invasion—namely, the same thing.

For some time now, persistent reports have linked these mercenary Koreans to brutalities in Vietnam which would make Rusty Calley blush. In June, the *Alternative Feature Service* (AFS) of Berkeley, California released a heretofore secret study by the RAND Corporation. It was not enough—Mention of Korean Troop

Activities in RAND Interviews," and thereby made public what the American government has known for at least six years. The 1966 document is replete with these stories of barbarity which Americans have learned how to take in and ignore:

- "When they came to the VC-controlled areas . . . they raped the women in those areas. There were times they killed the women after they had raped them. I heard just recently women were raped and killed. The people were so frightened of the Korean troops, they didn't dare to stay in their homes but moved away." (from a National Liberation Front deserter)

- ". . . only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them were women, children and elderly people. The Korean soldiers rounded them up in one place. The people thought that they were to be evacuated to the GVN-controlled areas by helicopters. . . . The Koreans suddenly pointed their guns at the crowd and opened fire. Only two babies of two and three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies." (from a refugee)

- ". . . when the Korean troops came, they called all the old women and children down in the trenches to come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterward, the Korean troops machine-gunned them." (from an NLF prisoner)

- "Everybody agreed that the Koreans were barbarous. They went on operations without interpreters going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs. Some people said it was because the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans couldn't help making a mistake. I don't think their reasoning was right. I don't

see why the Koreans should kill the children. Kids of two, three, or even five or seven years weren't VC. They also burned the paddy and the people's houses. They burned the cow pens and the animals inside too. Cows are certainly not VC!" (from a refugee)

The introduction to the document notes that "no effort has been made to ascertain the veracity of the statements made by the interviewees." And AFS quotes former RAND analyst Melvin Gurtov as saying that the report was "a draft circulated for comments . . . as opposed to a published study." It would be a mistake to surmise, however, that this report outlines the full extent of the U.S. government's information about South Korean murders in Vietnam. On the contrary, American officials have received at least three other major reports on the subject.

On January 10, 1970, A. Terry Rambo, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, told the *New York Times* that he had reported the extensive killing of civilians by South Korean troops to U.S. Army officers in Vietnam in 1966, but the information had been suppressed. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenoir, were researchers for Human Sciences Research (HSR), Inc., McLean, Virginia, on a refugee interview project for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Rambo took the atrocity information to American officials in Vietnam. He briefed a "group of ranking American officers in Saigon about the report." The result: Rambo was "ordered by a general officer of the MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff to cease investigating the Koreans—and no mention of it was to be made in our reports."

The Rambo team prepared two reports, one without atrocity information, one with it. This was done, according to Tinker, because they "knew that if our report contained anything about murders it would be classified

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The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China

By ALLEN S. WHITING

ABSTRACT: President Nixon's "journey for peace" to Peking has implicitly modified the image of a Chinese Communist aggressive threat delineated by all previous administrations. However, it has not explicitly redefined the administration's assumptions on the Chinese use of force. This has left considerable confusion and unease among Asian and American audiences who accept the concept of massive Chinese military force being deterred from aggression primarily by American security commitments, bases, and force postures extending from Korea and Japan to India. The nine instances wherein the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has crossed customary borders in hostile array during the past twenty-two years provide prima facie evidence for the conventional image of a potentially expansionist regime contained by American commitments and force. However, closer examination of the use of military force by the People's Republic reveals an entirely different situation whereby the government in Peking, in most cases, deployed the PLA in defensive reaction against a perceived threat. The Chinese use of force primarily for defensive deterrence has remained remarkably consistent over twenty-one years, and considerable continuity may be anticipated for at least the next five years.

ACCORDING to a Gallup poll, in September 1971 more than half the American public saw China as the greatest threat to world peace in the next few years.¹ Nothing has eventuated from President Nixon's self-styled "journey for peace" to Peking to change this perception, nor has the administration given any systematic assurances to the contrary. Instead the Pentagon continues to demand new, complex, and costly weapons systems for the West Pacific, ostensibly to deter potential Chinese aggression. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warns we must prepare to fight two nuclear wars at once, with the Soviet Union and with China.² Our Asian allies from Korea to Thailand worry aloud about the credibility of America's deterrence in the aftermath of stalemate and withdrawal from Vietnam, against a rising weariness of military burdens in Asia, manifested by congressional pressures for cuts in military assistance.

American and Asian anxiety over the future use of force by the People's Republic is rooted in recent history. On nine occasions in the past twenty-two years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has projected China's military power across its borders.³ In Korea (1950) and India (1962) major war resulted. In Laos (1964) and Vietnam (1965) PLA deployments risked Sino-American conflict. Two crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954-55 and 1958) ostensibly fell within the category of civil war, but nonetheless confronted the United States as protector of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In March 1969 bel-

Allan S. Whiting, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan since 1968. He previously taught at Michigan State, 1955-57, and Northwestern, 1951-53. He was a staff member of the Rand Corporation in the Social Science Division, 1957-61; Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, U.S. Department of State, 1961-66; and Deputy Principal Officer, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1966-68. Educated at Cornell and Columbia universities and the recipient of several fellowships, he is the author of *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-24* and coauthor of *Dynamics of International Relations; Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*; and *China Crosses the Yalu*.

continued

Ex-Agent Calls For More Curbs On CIA

By MORTON KONDRACKE

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WASHINGTON, April 20
VICTOR MARCHETTI does not look, act or talk like a top spy. He looks like an overweight bureaucrat and speaks quietly, in a voice that recalls Red Skelton.

Yet in the basement of his split-level Virginia ranch house hang autographed pictures of Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency ("To Vic—With appreciation for his support..."), and of a former CIA deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, whom Marchetti served as executive assistant.

Marchetti says he has hung the pictures "for fun." He has not framed Taylor's recent letter to him, written since Marchetti began speaking out about the Central Intelligence Agency, cautioning him not "to give help to our enemies within and without."

Taylor's letter refers to Marchetti's campaign to rehabilitate the CIA's public image. The CIA has been trying to rehabilitate its own image, and thanks to the press, has been successful. But Marchetti disagrees with the CIA press office's version and with most of the recent reporting on the agency.

BECAUSE OF the Pentagon Papers, Marchetti told me, "the CIA comes out looking good in Vietnam because in the last years it was trying to get the straight poop to the White House. And it does look good by comparison to the military.

"But, one, the CIA was hawkish in the beginning and was pretty late to see the light on the analysis side; and, two, even now it is hawkish on the other—clandestine services—side, where the big money is. After all, the CIA right now is conducting a \$500,000,000-a-year secret war in Laos.

"The analysts can say it's a lost cause, just like Vietnam, but in my view the CIA can't take credit for being so great when at the same time they are carrying out policies like this."

Marchetti, 41 years old, graduated from Pennsylvania State University in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history and was recruited for the CIA by a professor there who was secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout. Marchetti says the CIA's job offer was made at a secret meeting in 1956 when he was a stranger who identified himself over the telephone as "a friend of your brother."

After spending one year as a CIA agent in the field, Marchetti came up through the "analysis side" of the agency and ultimately was promoted to the executive staff working on the top floor of the agency's headquarters in Langley, Va. For three years he was special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, then to the agency's executive director, and finally to Taylor.

IN 1969, Marchetti quit the agency. He has given different reasons for making the final break. He says he told Helms "the intelligence community and the Central Intelligence Agency were just too big and too costly, that I thought there was too much military influence on intelligence—with very bad effects from that—and that I felt the need for more control and more direction.

"The clandestine attitude, the amorality of it all, the cold war mentality—these kinds of things made me feel that the agency was really out of step with the times," Marchetti told one interviewer.

"I just got fed up," he told another. His wife, he said, "knew I was unhappy and becoming more and more just a bureaucrat and said, 'Look, you're young enough to do something else. I'll work.'" So she took a job as a hospital clerk and Marchetti set to work writing a novel, "The Rope Dancer," placed in and around the executive suite at the CIA. In interviews, he guards details on CIA operations or techniques.

He apparently has been more generous with some Senators and Congressmen, including Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, who not long ago led a vain effort to limit the budget of the CIA and the Pentagon's intelligence apparatus to 4 billion dollars a year.

Marchetti does not say, if he knows, what the intelligence budget is, but he has adopted from published sources the figure 6 billion dollars a year, and the estimate that 200,000 persons are employed in American intelligence.

OF THESE, about 18,000 are with the CIA, 6000 of them working in clandestine services — that is, espionage, counter-espionage and covert actions ranging from propaganda to assassinations and paramilitary activity.

Once the Senate got into costs, Marchetti recalls, it became apparent "how much the Congress really doesn't know about the CIA." Marchetti says that "even Symington doesn't know. He is on the Armed Services Committee

and the Appropriations Committee, yet he doesn't know what's going on."

Said Marchetti: "It's one of my strong beliefs that the CIA has to be more tightly over-viewed by Congress. As it is now, the agency operates almost exclusively under the authority of the President.

"Add the shroud of secrecy that surrounds intelligence, and all kinds of things can go on. They're arrogant in the intelligence community. They think they know what's good for the country, and that the people and the Congress will eventually catch up. Because they are not tightly controlled, a lot of things can go out of whack."

Marchetti said, "Theoretically, it's possible for the CIA to pull the President into a war with the President kicking and screaming, but it's never been done to my knowledge; and all things being equal, I don't think it's very likely. The major covert activities of the agency have always been cleared with the White House, and, since Kennedy, there has been a mechanism—the 303 Committee, it used to be called, now it's the 40 Committee—chaired by the national security adviser and including the deputy secretaries of state and defense and the CIA director.

"WHENEVER ANY intelligence agency is going to launch a clandestine operation that has high flak potential, it has to be brought to the attention of the committee. This covers most of the big dirty tricks."

Although it may not be possible, according to Marchetti, for the CIA to start a war without the President's approval, it is most certainly possible to do so without the knowledge of Congress or the people, and, in fact, it has been done again and again.

The United States gets involved in such operations as the Laotian war, according to Marchetti, by initially developing a secret capacity to act, and then by using it. "You establish a phony airline, you make friends, you buy up arms and then you start bombing," he said. "For example, Civil Air Transport was once a Tawane national airline run jointly by

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Heroin traffic:

Some amazing
coincidences linking
the CIA, the Mafia,
Air America,
several
members of
the Brook Club,
Chiang
Kai-Shek,
the Kuomintang,
Prince Puchatra
of Thailand,
many banks and
insurance companies
— practically
everyone except
Richard Nixon.
Wasn't he asked?
by Peter Dale Scott

Professor Samuel Eliot Morison, a 1903 Theodore Roosevelt national law and more US Navy to support the "re" Panama from Colombia. The to the Canal Zone treaty, is de "Panama businessmen, agent [which stood to gain \$40 mill the treaty] and United States a to add that the "agents" of Company were New York in Seligman and their Washington who organized and financed suite in the Waldorf-Astoria.

In some ways, the Panar partition is an instructive pre involvement in Indochina.² Le be different today; for many preparing for revolution and lawed, under sections 956-60. In theory, at least, responsibility of American "interests" is not. But in fact, the CIA still m J. & W. Seligman and similar.

These contacts have been from Wall Street which succeeded CIA into its first covert operation who created the CIA in 19 unhappiness at the deflection

gence function: "I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations."³ His intentions, however, counted for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York corporation lawyer and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Administration became concerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian elections:


Forrestal felt that a secret counteraction was vital, but his initial assessment was that the Italian operation would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effectively in private hands. He urged strongly that the government establish a covert organization with unvouchered funds, the decision was made to create it under the National Security Council.⁴

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EARTH
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THE SELLING OF



Text by Morton Kondracke

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minimos

George Orwell wrote 1984 in an era that was ignorant of ecology. Thus he was able to fantasize a whole proletarian segment of the population that was immune to the doomsday games of the main characters of the State and its minions.

Today we know better that we are all One. When Montrose Chemicals dumps DDT by the ton into Los Angeles Harbor, the brown pelican lays eggs without shells and passes from the parade. When consumptive Americans build and drive — what, 80 million? — cars, the ground is pumped hollow and its contents dispersed into the air. When capitalism becomes the system under which goods are distributed, men cease to be brothers and their minds turn from co-operation to crime and warfare as ways of relating to each other.

Thus it comes as no surprise that the March issue of *Earth* magazine documents that the CIA has been involved in opium traffic in Southeast Asia for the past 20 years.

And it is understandable that ripples from this innocent exploitation of southeast Asian growers and pickers have washed back home. Overcrowded Veterans' Hospitals are turning junkie ex-GIs away and strung-out adolescents wander vacantly under neon lights. They must pay with tortured and shortened lives — smack presently takes more 13- to 35-year-olds than war, cancer or cars — while some of us feel it so far only in the \$2.5 billion junkies steal annually to feed their habits, in vice squad and hospital budgets.

The most incriminating article in *Earth* is by Prof. Peter Dale Scott, a friend of Allen Ginsberg. Ginsberg's own researches into CIA opium traffic were published in last May's *Romantic*, and he recently updated it on the Dick Cavett show.

Scott's article traces how certain Wall Street interests that controlled the CIA in its early days used it to set up far Eastern fronts for financial operations. One of these front companies — Civil Air Transport (CAT), later known as Air America — supplied arms and other supplies to the Nationalist Chinese troops of General Li Mi in Burma.

Li Mi and his troops long ago eased up on their fighting and turned to the more lucrative business of opium farming. Moreover, in order to maintain political links with secret Chinese societies and keep them hostile to Mao's revolution, they took over the opium traffic in northern Thailand and Laos. Air America continued to make "supply runs" flying opium and its derivative, heroin, around the world.

To second Scott's researches, *Earth* held a press conference last week at which Enrique B. del Rosario, a former "civilian aide" to Corregidor, said:

Thailand and Laos, reported seeing opium loaded aboard Air America planes in Laos and Thailand. Del Rosario stated that he had seen cultivated opium fields planted by Mao tribesmen. He said that the opium was later harvested, labeled "miscellaneous" cargo, and loaded into Air America planes at military bases.

Scott's article asserted that in 1955 alone 200 to 400 tons of opium were harvested in the Burma-Laos-Thailand "fertile triangle," and only 100 tons of it were consumed in Thailand. He quotes Eliot Marshall's estimate in *The New Republic* that 25 percent of all the smack in the U.S. comes from there.

"Up until about 1954, however, the United States ... complained officially and ostentatiously to the UN Narcotics Commission about 'Yunnan opium,' 'brand '999' morphine' and heroin from 'the Chinese mainland' as part of Peking's '20-year plan to finance political activities and spread addiction,'" Scott writes, while documenting that indeed many of the profits from smack sale went to finance the Nationalist China lobby in Washington which, until last year, successfully barred American recognition of the largest country in the world.

Scott is careful not to blow up the "personal venality of a US construction contractor or pilots dabbling in opium on the side" into a blanket condemnation of the CIA. "The CIA as an agency, it is true, cannot be identified with the narcotics trade any more than can the whole of the Kuomintang," he writes; and he admits that "the embarrassing links between Air America and CATCL (Air America) have been diminished in the last five years. . .

"But," he concludes, "the opium-based economy of Laos is still being protected by a coalition of opium-growing CIA mercenaries, Air America planes and Thai troops." And *Earth* editor James Goode angrily points out how corruption abroad has brought disaster back home:

"The CIA helped out our kids in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic turned them on to smack," he said at the press conference. "And we're paying the CIA \$6 billion a year for these services."

Scott's article, although unfortunately peppered with runners, "it is claimed's" and "said to be's," like most muckraking exposes is unassailably documented and almost uncreably intricate. Its basic premise seems sound. Anyway, I believe it, if only because it fits the zeitgeist. As they say at another of those untrustworthy three-letter institutions — IBM — information overload equals pattern recognition. The amount of official skulduggery to hit the fan in recent years is such that once someone suggests that the

CIA is trafficking smack, I'd be surprised to learn it was *not* so.

To me, the most enlightening comment on the CIA's workings appears in a companion article in *Earth*, "The Selling of the CIA," by Victor Marchetti, a former executive assistant to the number two man in the CIA. "It's interesting how the CIA liberals justify murder," he writes. "They hire the guy who hires the guy who actually commits the act, but they pretend they had no part in it."

This indirect inhumanity is most certainly a national, and maybe a human, failing. It's been reiterated over and over in connection with the Vietnam war: we are all guilty if we so much as participate in the economic system or pay our taxes. Capitalism: the economy is dependent on the war; crime: capitalism teaches the competitive ethic; war: the extension of crime by legal means.

It's so easy to lose sight of connections. When I was a kid, as simple a thing as an ice cream cone brought instant joy. It doesn't now, and what does? Almost nothing, unless I'm stoned or feeling really good. I do notice that if I get up briskly in the morning, do my yoga, keep busy and alert and exercise my mind, I have a general feeling of well-being; and that if I'm sluggish and lazy I become despondent and depressed. But I discover this only through recollection in tranquillity; I can't feel the direct connection. Shrinks call this losing touch with your feelings, but if it's a mental problem we all share the sickness. It comes, I suppose, partly from going, partly from cultural demands for insensitivity.

So it goes in our relations with each other. We're rude to the waitress without thinking that she'll go home pissed and holler at her kid who will beat up his brother who will.... We drive cars and complain about the pain in our lungs. We commit petty larceny from our employer who after all is exploiting us anyway. But we draw lines, however jagged and arbitrary they may be.

... The only difference I can see between these irregular moral boundaries and the immorality of the millionaire opium czars who feel no compunctions about poisoning and murdering their fellow men in order to keep up their consumptive and tyrannical habits is that the villains have questioned the capriciousness and hypocrisy of those lines. Why preach ethical vegetarianism while contributing to the deaths of refugees by paying taxes to back dictatorial governments? Why cry for cleaner air on newsprint which people will burn? Why pay

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CIA U.S.A.O. Dr. G. Schneider

COLORADO TO KOKO NOR

**The amazing true story
of the CIA's secret war
against Red China**

• The author, L. Fletcher Prouty, is a retired Air Force colonel who is now with the Center of Political Research in Washington, D.C.

STATOTHR

By L. FLETCHER PROUTY

NIGHT HAD obscured the mountains when the Air Force cargo plane finally approached the Pikes Peak country from the west. Wearily, it seemed, the aircraft crossed the south shoulder of the peak, turned left, dropped flaps and began the long, gradual descent to Peterson Field which serves both as an Air Force base and the municipal airport of Colorado Springs.

The landing was uneventful. But from that point some strange things happened.

The aircraft, a heavy-bodied C130 powered by four turbo-prop engines, taxied to a remote end of the field rather than to the regular ramp. A military bus quickly pulled up alongside.

If any outsider had been there to witness some 20 men disembark, he would have been told they were soldiers from India scheduled for training at nearby Ft. Carson under a military aid program.

But the troops weren't Indians and they never got to Ft. Carson.

The loaded bus headed westward out of Colorado Springs, up the Ute Pass highway, and disappeared into the night.

During the months that followed, other men like those in the first contingent mysteriously appeared and disappeared periodically in Colorado Springs in

the same mysterious manner and vanished into the mountains.

The identity of these men and the nature of their mission makes a fascinating story — and, in some respects, a frightening one — with vast international implications. Recent developments in relations between the United States and Communist China, which portend so much for an era of peace, give that story a special timeliness. The details of this operation are reported here for the first time.

To understand what this hush-hush operation was all about, it is necessary to set the time, which was August 1959, and to recall the ominous twilight zone — neither peace nor war — into which relations between East and West had drifted in that period. With an eye toward the successful culmination of his two-term administration, President Eisenhower announced a series of international events leading to a super-Summit Conference in Paris during May 1960.

The Korean War had settled into an uneasy truce six years earlier, in 1953. The Berlin Wall was still two years in the future, 1961. At the moment the point of East-West friction was at a most mythical land to most Americans

who connected it vaguely with a Ronald Coleman movie about Shangri-la.

There is nothing mythical about Tibet. It is an ancient country with an area four times that of Colorado, separated from India to the south by the Himalayan Range, many of whose peaks are twice as tall as Colorado's highest mountains. The country's average elevation is about 15,000 feet. Soon after the Communist government took over control of China in 1949, Peking announced its intentions of "liberating" Tibet. In October 1950 Chinese Communist troops invaded it.

Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader, the Dalai Lama, then only 15 years old, urged his people not to resist. The Chinese in turn left the Dalai Lama alone. But by February of 1959 it became evident the Chinese intended to seize him to gain undisputed control over that country.

Forewarned, the Dalai Lama and about 80 of his followers fled Lhasa, the capital city on March 17, 1959, heading for the safety of India. The Chinese were not aware of the Dalai Lama's departure for several days. They had been lulled by the fact that there were only two good routes out of Lhasa, both under Chinese control. The only route leading to India would have had to

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STATOTHR

What Nixon Must Do to Make Friends in Peking

Allen S. Whiting

tier in 1962, culminating in the Sino-Indian war that fall.

These crises produced Chinese Communist military reactions which, in turn, have been used to justify a vast network of US military bases, alliances, and military assistance programs throughout Asia, ostensibly to contain the threat of Chinese Communist aggression.

Such developments bear scrutiny by the American people and, thanks to the "Pentagon Papers," partial documentation can now prove what journalists could previously only allege. In the past, secrecy has served primarily to conceal the facts from Americans: the details have long been known in Peking. If, however, Americans are to understand Peking's demand that we "withdraw all US bases and military personnel from Taiwan," the facts about the concrete provocations that underlie this demand must be known. Only if we cease all hostile operations involving the Chinese Nationalists, whether from Taiwan and the offshore islands or elsewhere in Asia, can there be real hope that President Nixon's plan to visit Peking will result in a successful "journey of peace."

Clandestine Chinese Nationalist Air Activity: Taiwan to Tibet, 1954-61

The Chinese Nationalists have, with the knowledge and support of the United States, carried out clandestine air, sea, and land operations against mainland China and neighboring areas for twenty years. From 1950 to 1953, hostilities between Chinese Communist and United Nations forces in Korea may have justified our support for these activities. However, our shadowy involvement with Mao's civil war enemy steadily grew after the Korean War and the Geneva Conference of 1954.

The "Pentagon Papers" are highly revealing about the air operations in particular. According to a top secret memorandum from Brigadier General Edward Lansdale to General Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy's chief military adviser, a Chinese Nationalist commercial airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT), ostensibly "engaged in scheduled and non-scheduled air operations throughout the Far East," was actually

"a CIA proprietary."² CAT furnished, Lansdale wrote in 1961,

... air logistical support under commercial cover to most CIA and other US Government agencies' requirements... by providing trained and experienced personnel, procurement of supplies and equipment through overt commercial channels, and the maintenance of a fairly large inventory of transport and other type aircraft under both China and US registry.

CAT's activities extended far beyond the confines of China. As early as 1954, for instance, Lansdale, then a colonel, organized paramilitary teams in Saigon for sabotage and guerrilla warfare in North Vietnam. He reported that "CAT provided SMM [Saigon Military Mission] with the means for secret air travel between the North and Saigon."³ Lansdale also claimed that in 1958 CAT furnished "complete logistical and tactical support for the Indonesian operation," an abortive CIA effort to overthrow Sukarno through an army rebellion in Sumatra.⁴ But most pertinent for our purposes is the revelation that by 1961 CAT had carried out "more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet."⁵

Lansdale's memo forces us to reconsider the revolt against China that took place in Tibet in 1959, a revolt that had an important effect on subsequent Sino-American as well as Sino-Indian relations. At the time, Peking charged that outside help for the rebels came from Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalists openly acknowledged these charges.⁶ No independent verification was available, however, except through the somewhat exotic writings of a British missionary-journalist, George Patterson.⁷ Patterson's claim of divine guidance and his passionate advocacy of Tibetan resistance—he favored the militant, lesser-known Khambas of East Tibet against the more passive center of the Dalai Lama at Lhasa—aroused disbelief when he wrote his dramatic accounts. He got little attention, too, when he claimed that in 1955 he had acted as interpreter for an American official who offered clandestine help to

Summit meetings in the past between an American President and a communist leader have never resolved any existing problems, but they have created some basis of communication and understanding which have helped to prevent conflict. So too the meeting between President Nixon and Chou En-lai is unlikely to bring peace to Indochina or, at one stroke, dispose of Taiwan's future. However, if it is to lead to better relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, it must go far beyond the "exchanges of view" of Geneva, 1955, and Glassboro, 1967. It must mark concrete concessions by both sides on the most fundamental clash of interests, US relations with Chiang Kai-shek and the status of Taiwan.*

Walter P. McCaughy, the present US Ambassador to the Republic of China, testified in 1969 that "any US military presence or military-related activity on Taiwan is viewed by the Chinese Communists with especial hostility, since Peking considers such activity on Taiwan as interference in its internal affairs."¹ This statement conceals a double-truth. First, we *did* interfere in China's internal affairs when, in June, 1950, we interposed the US Seventh Fleet between the two sides of a civil war. And we have been intervening ever since, having supplied \$2.5 billion in military assistance to one side, the Nationalists, while making a treaty commitment to defend them from attack by the other side, the Communists.

But even more direct and threatening an interference in China's internal affairs, at least as perceived by Peking, has been what Ambassador McCaughy elliptically referred to as our "military-related activity." In conjunction with the Chinese Nationalists we have sponsored and supported a wide range of espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla activities on the mainland. Those activities created crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958 and, as we shall see, furthered a revolt in Tibet in 1959. Covert operations from Taiwan heightened Chinese alarm over Indian advances on the Tibetan fron-

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
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Secret U.S. Action Against Chinese Aired in Congress

By JAMES MCCARTNEY
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The story of clandestine U.S. military activities against mainland China has unfolded here before a joint House-Senate committee.



BACKGROUND
REPORT

A former Chinese expert for the State Department testified that the United States, in 20 years, has played a key role in mounting "espionage, sabotage and guerrilla" activities against China.

The witness, Allen S. Whiting, now with the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, said "secrecy and censorship" have

made it impossible for the public to know what was going on.

He blamed the secret activities for starting a whole series of wars in the Far East — and contributing heavily to the start of the Vietnam war.

Whiting's descriptions are believed to be the most detailed made public of secret activities against China mounted by the United States in cooperation with Formosa.

He blamed the U.S.-Taipei efforts for:

- Creating crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958.
- Adding to the flames of a revolt in Tibet in 1959.
- Heightening Chinese "alarm" of Indian advances on the Tibetan frontier in 1962, which led to a Chinese-Indian war in the fall of 1962.

HE SAID THESE CRISES "triggered Chinese Communist military reactions which, in turn, have been used to justify a vast expanse of U.S. military bases, alliances and military assistance programs throughout Asia, ostensibly to contain the threat of Chinese Communist aggression."

These expenditures, he said, have been made "largely in response to a nonthreat."

Whiting's testimony was praised by John Fairbank, who is director of Harvard University's East Asian Research Center and considered the nation's top Chinese expert.

"We should be outraged," Fairbank said, "about the way in which the military had their cap set under the argument of secrecy."

HE SAID WHITING'S testimony indicated the CIA is able "to conduct wars which in turn produced responses from the People's Republic (China) without the American public knowing about it."

It is not known whether the United States is continuing secret operations against China since President Nixon announced plans to visit the RE.

There have been reports that the Nixon Administration has ordered a halt to the dispatching of special, CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols.

But Whiting described much more elaborate activities.

HE SAID THE "SHADOWY involvement" of the United States grew rapidly after the Korean War and the Geneva Conference of 1954.

He identified a Formosan airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT), as being connected with the CIA.

CAT, he said, provided a "commercial cover" for CIA and other secret government activities.

These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These were not reconnaissance, but airdrops of supplies and possibly men for guerrilla warfare."

IN THE 1960S, according to Whiting, CAT "gave way" to a new "cover."

It has been called China Air Lines, which began operations in Laos and later moved to South Vietnam.

China Air Lines has carried out "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as "more dangerous missions," Whiting said.

He said Formosa has also provided the headquarters for Air Asia, a subsidiary of Air America, a CIA-operated airline in Southeast Asia.

HE DESCRIBED AIR ASIA as the "only facility in the Far East — excluding Japan — with modern jet fighter maintenance and overhaul contracts."

"Well over 6,000 combat aircraft were serviced there in the fiscal year 1969," he said.

China Air Lines, Air Asia and Air America, he said, work together to support U.S. attacks in Laos mounted from bases in Thailand. All, of course, are secret.

These activities, he said, help to explain China's road-building activities in northern Laos as well as its efforts to provide anti-aircraft facilities.

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Peril to Nixon Trip Seen

Secrecy Is Charged In U.S. Aid to Taiwan

By RAY MOSELEY

Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington -- A former State Department official said today the Government is concealing the full extent of U.S. military and intelligence operations on Taiwan (Formosa) from Congress and the American public.

Such operations, directed against mainland China, must cease if President Nixon's forthcoming "journey for peace" to Peking is to succeed, said Allen S. Whiting, chief China specialist in the State Department from 1962 to 1966.

Whiting, now a professor at the University of Michigan, testified at a hearing on China policy conducted by the congressional Joint Economic Committee.

Quotes From Documents

Quoting official documents and news reports, Whiting outlined a variety of alleged U.S. intelligence activities in support of Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan that have

come to light over the last 20 years, and said:


"In sum, there is a credible case that overt and covert U.S.-Chinese Nationalist activities have aroused Chinese Communist security concerns, resulting in heightened military deployments toward and across China's borders. This activity, in turn, has been used to justify increased American and allied military investment throughout Asia to guard against the so-called Chinese Communist aggressive threat."

Whiting said a complete assessment of U.S. involvement with the Nationalists has been seriously hampered by secrecy and censorship.

"Certainly Peking has known more of what has been going on than has Washington, or at least the legislative branch of our government," he said.

May Block Settlement

Whiting said U.S. covert activities on Taiwan may block a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem by the Nationalists and Communists and lead to continued military



Allen S. Whiting

escalation on both sides.

"Only a convincing and credible reversal of our military-intelligence use of Taiwan can lay the basis for confidence necessary to make President Nixon's 'journey for peace' a successful reality," he said.

The Nixon Administration was reported recently to have ordered a halt to clandestine activities, including U.S. spy plane flights over China, to avoid upsetting plans for Mr. Nixon's trip.

In his testimony, Whiting cited these examples of covert activities allegedly supported by the U.S. against China:

Airlines' Activities

-- The Nationalist airline Civil Air Transport (CAT), identified in the recent Pentagon Papers as owned by the Central Intelligence Agency, operated from bases in Thailand in the 1950s to ferry supplies to guerillas in northern Burma, Laos, Tibet and China's Yunnan Province.

-- China Air Lines (CAL), another apparent CIA operation, provided planes and pilots to Vietnam and Laos and admitted involvement in "clandestine intelligence operations."

-- A CIA line called Air Asia is headquartered in Taiwan, with the job of servicing jet fighter planes.

-- U.S. Rangers have trained guerilla paratroopers in Taiwan, and some Nationalist forces have served secretly in South Vietnam.

-- Nationalist China has received "a steady stream of cut-rate weapons out of the mammoth Vietnam stockpile" and some deliveries have been "unauthorized, uncontrolled and often unknown to the Congress."

STATOTHR

MIAMI, FLA.
NEWS

JUL 5 1971
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Sylvan Meyer

Plots for a thousand novels rife in Pentagon papers

You could wear out your tri-focals pouring through the Pentagon documents, not to mention the 400 page official summary of Vietnam history read aloud the other night by Sen. Gravel of Alaska.

And you can hardly blame the senator for waxing emotional. What the senator did not reveal, though he probably knows, is what the U.S. is up to today in clandestine operations and in policy debates.

There are several novels hidden in the understated drama of the papers that have been released since the Supreme Court decision earlier this week. Perhaps the stories are too real today to be fictionalized.

One novel might be structured around the foreboding U.S. leaders felt in the early 1960s about a national commitment to keep communism out of South Vietnam.

Maxwell Taylor, in November 1961, informed President Kennedy that a commitment to protect South Vietnam from communism might pull us into an endless morass, but he recommended the commitment be made, anyway. Gen. Taylor's own struggle to decide the moral and military issues, if we knew the man's inner mind, would provide a dramatist all the material he could wish for a play or a book.

Our 1961 concern over Diem's

leadership, our final desperation with him as his own forces rebelled against him and our concluding offer to help preserve his personal safety, all revealed in detail by the papers, would have provided Shakespeare a plot equal to that of Richard III. Not many modern writers, with their contemporary fixation on individual introspection and revelation, would tackle a story of one leader's confrontation with almost cosmic forces.

And the spy writers have a bottomless well of source material in the stranger than fiction disclosures of the most recently published documents. A memo on unconventional warfare directed to Gen. Taylor, for example, shows intrigue and duplicity enough to baffle James Bond. Indeed, the fictional spies barely could earn a merit badge in espionage compared to the real thing.

This memo tells of clandestine training bases in Okinawa and Saipan, working under the cover of routine Navy and Army setups, teaching counter-intelligence, CIA support activities and psychological warfare. It tells of a small ship, ostensibly owned by a Baltimore company, with an American captain and a Philippine crew ready for "paramilitary activities" in the Far East area.

It tells of "Frisco" Johnny San

Juan, an old Huk guerrilla fighter of the Philippines, who working as head of a corporation known as Eastern Construction, directed "unconventional operations" in Indochina, helped write the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam and for a while received clandestine U.S. support for his activities.

The old pulp magazines, whose authors in this day and age obviously have turned to TV script writing, could have a time with "CAT," an airline headquartered in Taiwan and referred to in the documents as "a CIA proprietary." CAT provided logistical support to CIA operatives and U.S. agencies in Asia, overflew mainland China frequently and "demonstrated its capacity to meet all types of contingencies or longterm cover air support requirements in support of U.S. objectives." Here is a ready made plot for daring pilots air dropping supplies to the French at Dien Bien Phu, which CAT actually did, we learn a decade and a half after the fact.

In detail, after detail the documents provide true stories of operations in advising foreign governments, organizing military units in Thailand and Laos, supplying them with arms for border raids and counter guerrilla fighting. But maybe fiction readers wouldn't believe such far out material.

KEY VIETNAM TEXTS

THE KENNEDY YEARS

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communist in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal.

normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation of hand. To achieve that effect following suggested:

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4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question officials. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

The New Opium War

by Frank Browning and Banning Garrett

"MR. PRESIDENT, THE SPECTER OF heroin addiction is haunting nearly every community in the nation." With these urgent words, Senator Vance Hartke spoke up on March 2 in support of a resolution on drug control being considered in the U.S. Senate. Estimating that there are 500,000 heroin addicts in the U.S., he pointed out that nearly 20 percent of them are teenagers. The concern of Hartke and others is not misplaced. Heroin has become the major killer of young people between 18 and 35, outpacing death from accidents, suicides or cancer. It has also become a major cause of crime: to sustain their habits, addicts in the U.S. spend more than \$15 million a day, half of it coming from the 55 percent of crime in the cities which they commit and the annual \$2.5 billion worth of goods they steal.

Once safely isolated as part of the destructive funkiness of the black ghetto, heroin has suddenly spread out into Middle America, becoming as much a part of suburbia as the Saturday barbecue. This has gained it the attention it otherwise never would have had. President Nixon himself says it is spreading with "pandemic virulence." People are becoming aware that teenagers are shooting up at lunchtime in schools and returning to classrooms to nod the day away. But what they don't know—and what no one is telling them—is that neither the volcanic eruption of addiction in this country nor the crimes it causes would be possible without the age-old international trade in opium (from which heroin is derived), or that heroin addiction—like inflation, unemployment, and most of the other chaotic forces in American society today—is directly related to the U.S. war in Indochina.

The connection between war and opium in Asia is as old as empire itself. But the relationship has never been so symbiotic, so intricate in its networks and so vast in its implications. Never before has the trail of tragedy been so clearly marked as in the present phase of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. For the international traffic in opium has expanded in lockstep with the expanding U.S. military presence there, just as heroin has stalked the same young people in U.S. high schools who will also be called on to fight that war. The ironies that have accompanied the war in Vietnam since its onset are more poignant than before. At the very moment that public officials are wringing their hands over the heroin problem, Washington's own Cold War crusade, replete with clandestine activities that would seem far-fetched even in a spy novel, continues to play a major role in a process that has already rerouted the opium traffic from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and is every day opening new channels for its shipment to the U.S. At the same time the government starts crash programs to rehabilitate drug users

among its young people, the young soldiers it is sending to Vietnam are getting hooked and dying of overdoses at the rate of one a day. While the President is declaring war on narcotics and on crime in the streets, he is widening the war in Laos, whose principal product is opium and which has now become the funnel for nearly half the world's supply of the narcotic, for which the U.S. is the chief consumer.

There would have been a bloodthirsty logic behind the expansion of the war into Laos if the thrust had been to seize supply centers of opium the communists were hoarding up to spread like a deadly virus into the free world. But the communists did not control the opium there: processing and distribution were already in the hands of the free world. Who are the principals of this new opium war? The ubiquitous CIA, whose role in getting the U.S. into Vietnam is well known but whose pivotal position in the opium trade is not; and a rogue's gallery of organizations and people—from an opium army subsidized by the Nationalist Chinese to such familiar names as Madame Nhu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky—who are the creations of U.S. policy in that part of the world.

The story of opium in Southeast Asia is a strange one at every turn. But the conclusion is known in advance: this war has come home again—in a silky grey powder that goes from a syringe into America's mainline.

MOST OF THE OPIUM in Southeast Asia is grown in a region known as the "Fertile Triangle," an area covering northwestern Burma, northern Thailand, and Laos. It is a mountainous jungle inhabited by tigers, elephants, and some of the most poisonous snakes in the world. The source of the opium that shares the area with these exotic animals is the poppy, and the main growers are the Meo hill tribespeople who inhabit the region. The Meo men chop back the forests in the wet season so that the crop can be planted in August and September. Poppies produce red, white or purple blossoms between January and March, and when the blossom withers, an egg-sized pod is left. The women harvest the crop and make a small incision in the pod with a three-bladed knife. The pod exudes a white latex-like substance which is left to accumulate and thicken for a day or two. Then it is carefully gathered, boiled to remove gross impurities, and the sticky substance is rolled into balls weighing several pounds. A fraction of the opium remains to be smoked by the villagers, but most is sold in nearby rendezvous with the local smugglers. It is the Meos' only cash crop. The hill tribe growers can collect as much as \$50 per kilo, paid in gold, silver, various commodities, or local currency. The same kilo will bring \$200 in Saigon and \$2000 in San Francisco.

There are hundreds of routes, and certainly as many methods of transport by which the smugglers ship opium—

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